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The purpose of this paper is to provide a basic frame-
work useful to understand some recent debates about 
models of business cycles, particularly, the papers by 
Prescott and Summers (that follow in this issue). I de-
scribe a very general model that has as particular cases 
most of the current research in this area. Within this 
framework, I contrast the current research to traditional 
macroeconomic analysis as well as discuss some prob-
lems associated with the modern strategy. Finally, I 
interpret Summers' discussion of Prescott's paper in 
terms of the general framework. 
The General Framework 
Modern economic analysis of aggregate behavior (the 
type of problems that both business cycle theory and 
growth theory are concerned with) is methodologically 
similar to the study of microeconomic phenomena. 
Specifically, in the modern approach, the restrictions 
imposed by theory on aggregate behavior must be the 
result of aggregating the restrictions imposed on indi-
vidual behavior. 
The general framework that this modern analysis 
uses is some variant of the following. Individual eco-
nomic agents view themselves as playing a dynamic 
(possibly stochastic) game. More explicitly, individual 
agents understand the rules of the game in the sense that 
they can evaluate the consequences of all the players' 
actions, including their own. These generic agents each 
have an objective function and choose their strategy in 
order to maximize it.
1 
While this framework seems general enough to 
address any interesting economic problem, it is too 
general to imply restrictions on the aggregate data. To 
get such restrictions, more structure must be imposed 
on the general framework, or model. To see how to do 
that, consider, for example, the problem of typical con-
sumers/workers in the environment just described. At 
any point in time, these agents may or may not be 
employed. If unemployed, they must decide whether to 
accept any job available (even if the only available 
offers are for very low-paying jobs) or to search for a 
better offer. At the same time, they must decide how 
much to consume of each good and how much to save 
(possibly, how much to dissave). If employed, the choices 
are qualitatively not very different. Agents must decide 
whether to continue the employment relationship or to 
quit and look for another job, how many hours they are 
willing to work, and how much they want to consume 
and save (including how to hold their wealth). Of 
course, many other important decisions can be ig-
nored—like whether to go to the beach or the moun-
tains for a vacation or whether to have children or 
not—because they are not crucial to an understanding 
*I have benefited from many thoughtful conversations on this and related 
subjects with Larry Jones. He, Robert Hodrick, and Jim Peck provided useful 
comments on an earlier version. None of them are responsible for the remaining 
errors. 
1 This description corresponds to that presented in the excellent monograph 
by Lucas (1986). 
3 of movements in aggregates like income, output, or 
consumption. The typical decision problems faced by 
other agents (firms and even government agencies) can 
be described in a similar way. 
Yet this description of decision problems is missing a 
crucial element. Individual choices at any point in time 
are influenced by what agents believe will be their 
available opportunities in the future. It is almost impos-
sible to think of a well-defined decision problem that 
does not depend on the expectations that agents have 
about the environment they will be facing. And changes 
in expectations about a future event will generally 
affect current decisions, even if none of the contempo-
raneous constraints has moved.
2 A complete descrip-
tion of individuals' decision problems, therefore, must 
explicitly model how agents form their expectations. 
Assume that enough is known about each individual 
problem to analyze it. How, then, is a theory of the 
behavior of the aggregates obtained? Simple: Add up 
the decisions of all the players—consumers, firms, and 
government agencies—and impose a solution that 
makes all these decisions consistent. Then the frame-
work can be confronted with some questions. Consider, 
for example, the effect of a change in a government 
policy. How will the hypothetical economy react to 
such a change? To answer this type of question, include 
the new policy as part of the rules of the game and 
compute a new solution assuming the agents make their 
best choices given the new rules. This may be a very 
difficult exercise to analyze, but the mechanics of it are 
well defined.
3 
With regard to such policy questions, the general 
framework restricts economists in at least two ways: 
how they specify and how they evaluate policies. 
Because individual decisions depend on expecta-
tions, policies analyzed in this framework must be 
defined in terms of what the government does both in 
the current period and in future periods.
4 For suppose 
this is not specified, and questions like this are asked: 
What is the effect on the gross national product of 
increasing this week's money supply 10 percent? Try-
ing to follow the procedure above will reveal that more 
information is needed to answer that type of question. 
For example, agents will need to learn or guess what 
will happen to other relevant variables in the future. 
Will this change be temporary or permanent? Since the 
government is collecting an inflation tax, will other 
taxes be changed or will government expenditures be 
changed? Without answers to these and many other 
questions, the policy cannot be analyzed; it is not well 
defined. An analyst must either learn more about it or 
guess, without much information, how individual agents 
will answer the questions. 
Many traditional macroeconomic policy analyses 
have asked questions that are not well defined in this 
sense. The basic principle of modeling economic agents 
as facing dynamic problems and trying to maximize 
their objectives limits the class of questions that can be 
asked. This is not the consequence of any particular 
model—the very general description above probably 
includes most interesting models as special cases. It is, 
rather, a restriction imposed by the requirement that 
aggregate phenomena be explicitly modeled as the sum 
of decisions made by maximizing individuals. 
This approach to modeling macroeconomic phe-
nomena restricts economists in another way, too. It 
suggests a natural way to evaluate the consequences of 
alternative policies: compare the utility levels achieved 
by each player under the different policies. Such a 
measure of desirability is a departure from traditional 
approaches to aggregate analysis, but it is one that can 
hardly be argued against. 
To summarize, the modern way of modeling eco-
nomic behavior (and not any particular model in this 
class) forces economists to analyze macroeconomic 
policies very precisely. Departures from this strategy— 
for example, some instances of traditional macroeco-




the General Framework 
The framework just described is too general to be useful 
to analyze particular alternative policies; it is too 
abstract to give predictions about the effects on aggre-
gate variables of some shocks. To be able to give such 
predictions, the model must be specialized. How is this 
best done? It does not seem possible to find a single 
criterion that the whole economics profession will 
accept. According to the statistical tradition, however, 
models that generate behavior similar to the actual time 
2 A good example is the effect on portfolio decisions in 1986 generated by 
the change in the tax code starting in 1987. Some economic agents decided to 
realize capital gains in 1986 just because postponing the decision would have 
implied a higher tax rate. 
3 Analyzing policy changes under rational expectations requires specifying 
the prior probability agents put on the new policy. One approach is to interpret 
new policies as regime changes. On this, see Flood and Garber 1983. 
4Of course, this policy need not be deterministic. It can specify how the 
government will react in each possible future situation. 
5 The ideas in this section are in no way new. They can be traced to Lucas 
1976. See also Lucas and Sargent 1979,1981 and Miller and Rolnick 1980 for 
related arguments. 
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series are probably to be preferred.
6 
Even if that criterion is accepted, though, the process 
of specialization is highly conflictive. This is so because 
the basic modeling approach does not discriminate be-
tween micro and macro observations: both have to be 
explained within the model because the same agents 
generate both the micro and the macro data. But spe-
cializing the model is basically giving up on the possi-
bility of explaining some micro phenomena in order to 
obtain a structure that is tractable. Once specialized, 
therefore, the model can be attacked on the grounds 
that it does not explain some micro observation. 
As an example, consider the models Prescott surveys 
(in this issue). Most of them are representative agent 
models. Formally, the models assume a large number of 
consumers, but they are specialized by assuming also 
that the consumers are identical. One of the conse-
quences of this specialization is a very sharp prediction 
about the volume of trade: it is zero. If explaining 
observations on the volume of trade is considered essen-
tial to an analysis, this prediction is enough to dismiss 
such models. But if accounting for individual fluctua-
tions beyond the component explained by aggregate 
fluctuations is not considered essential to understand 
the effects of business cycles,
7 the abstraction is not 
unreasonable. A case can even be made that if what 
matters, in terms of utility, is the behavior of aggregate 
consumption and leisure, then any model that helps 
explain movements in these two variables is useful in 
evaluating alternative policies. This usefulness is inde-
pendent of the ability of the model to explain other 
observations.
8 
The near future will not likely bring models that can 
be useful to analyze policy questions and also are con-
sistent with every single piece of available evidence, 
both micro and macro. Nor will the future likely soon 
bring a rule based on the structure of the models that 
will select the pieces of information that must be con-
sistent with them. For now, some other selection criteria 
are necessary. Today is too early to summarize the 
relevant alternatives. What will likely happen is what 
has happened with many other methodological deci-
sions that guide scientific practice: discussion among 
the scientists will result in some guidelines that will be 
accepted by most of the profession. 
Many current discussions in aggregate economics 
can be interpreted as debates about the best set of 
criteria to select useful models within the general class 
presented above. This is how I will interpret the Pres-
cott-Summers exchange (in this issue). 
Real Business Cycle Models 
Before discussing that exchange, I will describe some 
special features of real business cycle models and the 
different strategies that can be used to confront them 
with the data. 
Special Features 
As their name suggests, models of real business cycles 
abstract away from monetary phenomena. They are 
only interested in the behavior of real magnitudes (like 
consumption, employment, investment), and they can-
not address questions related to such nominal variables 
as the price level or to policies like open market opera-
tions. If these models are to be useful in the analysis and 
evaluation of macroeconomic policies, the following 
form of monetary neutrality must hold: no matter how 
monetary policy is conducted, the behavior of real 
quantities is determined by real shocks to the economy.
9 
As a subclass, real business cycle models need not 
assume anything about the nature of the interaction 
among agents; in particular, they need not assume that 
markets are competitive. They also need not assume 
anything about the nature of the shocks—if any—that 
affect the system. 
The line of research initiated by Kydland and Pres-




builds on the growth theory literature
1
1
 and enriches the 
basic structure so that it can account for fluctuations 
about a trend. The crucial elements are the assumptions 
that markets are competitive, all information is public 
(so markets are complete), and technology shocks drive 
the economic system. These shocks are interpreted as 
the production function residuals that Solow (1957) 
first identified. This special case has other assumptions, 
like the existence of a representative consumer, that are 
very important in the sense that the techniques that 
Kydland and Prescott use to characterize the equilib-
rium depend on them. But those assumptions are not 
6 For a description of a criterion for selecting useful models from the class of 
well-articulated models, see Lucas 1980. 
7For an argument suggesting how this might be true, see Lucas 1986. 
8 In particular, the usefulness is independent of the ability of the model to 
account for the behavior of asset prices. 
9For a critical treatment of models of real business cycles, including their 
inability to account for monetary phenomena, see McCallum 1986. 
10This line of research has been extended by others, including Long and 
Plosser (1983), Kydland (1984), Kydland and Prescott (1984), and Hansen 
(1985). 
1 !The pioneering work is Solow 1956. The analysis of the optimal growth 
model was initiated by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). Within this frame-
work, stochastic shocks to the production function were first analyzed by 
Brock and Mirman (1972). 




The Kydland-Prescott (1982) model and the up-
dating by Prescott (in this issue) are extremely simple. 
The model has only one good, and investment may take 
several periods. Some versions of the model—for 
example, Hansen's (1985) and Rogerson's (1984)—can 
accommodate unemployment. Long and Plosser (1983) 
have analyzed a multisector version with a simpler 
technology. 
Data Strategies 
The approach of concentrating on the real aspects of 
business cycles does not point to a preferred way to 
confront these models with data. Nothing in the ap-




 However, these are not the tech-
niques that Kydland and Prescott use in their original 
(1982) paper or that Prescott describes in his update (in 
this issue). 
Prescott's strategy is to use growth and cross-section 
observations to tie down the parameters of preferences 




 As an important methodological point, 
he emphasizes that data related to the phenomenon 
under study should not be used to calibrate the model.
1
5 
Criticisms of Real Business Cycle Models 
Now I will review Summers' four criticisms of real 
business cycle models (in this issue) from the perspec-
tive of the general framework for modern aggregate 
analysis. 
Summers first criticizes the appropriateness of using 
growth observations to tie down parameters of prefer-
ences and technology and the resulting accuracy of 
Prescott's estimates of some key parameters. Summers 
suggests that different data sets would have resulted in 
different parameter values. If that is so, some criterion 
must be developed to pick the most appropriate data 
set. This type of critical analysis will probably make 
aggregate models more consistent with micro evidence. 
Summers' second criticism is that technology shocks 
cannot explain the observed movements of output 
about a trend. He insists that model builders should be 
more specific about the nature of these shocks. This is 
a criticism that does not challenge the ability of real 
business cycle models to generate behavior that resem-
bles actual time series; instead, it focuses on the sources 
of the driving shocks. As with the questions about the 
models' parameters, this type of criticism will probably 
result in a more careful analysis of the micro evidence, 
here, for the nature of technology shocks.
1
6 
The third criticism that Summers makes is that the 
Kydland and Prescott model generates predictions 
about the joint behavior of interest rates and asset prices 
that do not agree with the available evidence. This 
argument basically says that any acceptable model of 
business cycles must explain not only the co-move-
ments of quantities like consumption, investment, and 
employment, but also the movements of asset prices. 
This argument clearly falls within the previous discus-
sion of how much a model must explain and is therefore 
difficult to evaluate. 
Finally, Summers suggests that economic downturns 
are associated with "breakdowns in the exchange 
mechanism." In his view, apparently, these breakdowns 
are associated with the inability of a flexible-price, 
market-clearing mechanism to account for some ob-
servations. Although the criticism suggests that analysis 
beyond the subclass of models that Prescott summa-
rizes is necessary, the criticism formally corresponds to 
bringing new evidence and asking whether the models 
can generate behavior consistent with it. Answering 
that question is not easy, in part because an operative 
definition of the breakdowns is not available. As with 
Summers' third criticism, this one suggests that useful 
models of business cycles must explain more than the 
available models do. 
Summers' criticisms, then, fall into two categories. 
The first two challenge how Prescott uses available 
evidence to specify the model, without challenging 
Prescott's overall empirical strategies. The second two 
question the usefulness of the models Prescott de-
scribes, on the grounds that they fail to explain some 
observations. This criticism cannot apply to real busi-
ness cycle models as a whole, though, because the 




 With many consumers, the equilibrium will be the Pareto optimal alloca-
tion for an economy in which the utility function is a weighted average of the 
individual utility functions. However, the fact that the representative agent is 
an average has implications about how some partial microeconomic empirical 
evidence can be used to restrict the parameters of the utility functions. 
13Altug (1985) uses traditional maximum likelihood methods in a version 
of the original Kydland-Prescott (1982) model. See also the analysis of aggre-
gate data in Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton 1984. 
14This is not strictly accurate, because the arguments Prescott uses to 
determine the variance of the technology shock use data on cyclical variations. 
1
5
 This strategy does not seem to agree very well with the principle that the 
model should explain both growth and fluctuations. However, Prescott points 
out that growth can be introduced into the model in a way that validates his 
separation of growth and fluctuations. 
16As Lucas (1986) points out, technology shocks are very similar to the 
development of new technologies or new goods. 
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Concluding Comments 
The models analyzed by Prescott have two major 
advantages over other candidate models of business 
cycles. First, they are firmly grounded in the tradition 
that aggregate phenomena must be explained as the 
outcomes of the decisions made by individual agents. 
Of course, this implies that they are explicit models that 
can be scrutinized. Disagreeing with Prescott is rela-
tively easy because so is understanding how agents 
behave in the economies he presents. Second, the anal-
yses of the models surveyed by Prescott show how an 
extremely simple structure can generate behavior that 
resembles the actual time series. They go even further 
and show that movements of macroeconomic variables 
about a trend can be viewed as optimal responses to 
exogenous shocks. As Lucas (1986, p. 76) puts it, "Cer-
tainly no one would argue that Kydland and Prescott's 
work has established this conclusion, but neither do I 
believe that it can be firmly rejected on the basis of 
currently available evidence" [Lucas' italics]. 
How do the papers by Prescott and Summers help 
improve the understanding of business cycles? Not only 
do they make explicit how available evidence can be 
used to choose among models; they also indicate what 
observations may not agree with the predictions of the 
models. A better understanding of real business cycle 
models is certainly a prerequisite of their use in formu-
lating and evaluating economic policies. More careful 
examination of the evidence along these lines will also 
increase the understanding of the potential role of other 
models, monetary models as well as noncompetitive 




tion of real business cycle models can only improve 
both the understanding of the phenomena and the abili-
ty to choose beneficial policies. 
Explicit models like those described by Prescott will 
no doubt be improved by careful examination of micro 
data. The next generation of models, though, will proba-
bly try to account for more observations. Clearly, as 
Lucas (1980, p. 697) says, "The more dimensions on 
which the model mimics the answers actual economies 
give to simple questions, the more we trust its answers 
to harder questions." The continuous development of 
new tools of analysis suggests that someday tractable 
models will be produced that will also explain the 
behavior of a richer set of time series. Careful scrutiny 
of existing models will give useful insights on how to 
allow development of more elaborate ones. Pioneering 
analyses, like those summarized by Prescott, and criti-
cal evaluations, like the one presented by Summers, will nFor an argument that suggests that there is some evidence of monetary 
help keep economists pointed in the right direction. effects in business cycles, see Lucas 1986 and McCallum 1986. 
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